Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information.
The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better informatio...
| 主要な著者: | , |
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| フォーマット: | Working paper |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
European Central Bank
2009
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| _version_ | 1826264301350944768 |
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| author | Carboni, G Ellison, M |
| author_facet | Carboni, G Ellison, M |
| author_sort | Carboni, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output volatility. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:05:35Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:28cc675a-cf95-4bd0-ae07-f7b403a3032d |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:05:35Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | European Central Bank |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:28cc675a-cf95-4bd0-ae07-f7b403a3032d2022-03-26T12:15:07ZInflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:28cc675a-cf95-4bd0-ae07-f7b403a3032dEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsEuropean Central Bank2009Carboni, GEllison, MThe assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output volatility. |
| spellingShingle | Carboni, G Ellison, M Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information. |
| title | Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information. |
| title_full | Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information. |
| title_fullStr | Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information. |
| title_short | Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information. |
| title_sort | inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT carbonig inflationandoutputvolatilityunderasymmetricincompleteinformation AT ellisonm inflationandoutputvolatilityunderasymmetricincompleteinformation |