Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fÄur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189{206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141{162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points und...
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| Formáid: | Working paper |
| Teanga: | English |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
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| Achoimre: | Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fÄur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189{206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141{162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process. |
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