Interventionism and mental surgery

John Campbell has claimed that the interventionist account of causation must be amended if it is to be applied to causation in psychology. The problem, he argues, is that it follows from the so-called ‘surgical’ constraint on interventions that intervening on psychological states requires the suspen...

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Main Author: Kaiserman, A
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Springer 2018
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author Kaiserman, A
author_facet Kaiserman, A
author_sort Kaiserman, A
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description John Campbell has claimed that the interventionist account of causation must be amended if it is to be applied to causation in psychology. The problem, he argues, is that it follows from the so-called ‘surgical’ constraint on interventions that intervening on psychological states requires the suspension of the agent’s rational autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the problem Campbell identifies is in fact an instance of a wider problem for interventionism, extending beyond psychology, which I call the problem of ‘abrupt transitions’. I then defend a solution to the problem, which replaces the surgical constraint with a weaker constraint on interventions that nevertheless does all the work the surgical constraint was designed to do. I conclude by exploring some interesting consequences of this weaker constraint for causation in psychology.
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spelling oxford-uuid:29fd2f82-9c1d-4566-9c5a-ab63753820982022-03-26T12:22:14ZInterventionism and mental surgeryJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:29fd2f82-9c1d-4566-9c5a-ab6375382098EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer2018Kaiserman, AJohn Campbell has claimed that the interventionist account of causation must be amended if it is to be applied to causation in psychology. The problem, he argues, is that it follows from the so-called ‘surgical’ constraint on interventions that intervening on psychological states requires the suspension of the agent’s rational autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the problem Campbell identifies is in fact an instance of a wider problem for interventionism, extending beyond psychology, which I call the problem of ‘abrupt transitions’. I then defend a solution to the problem, which replaces the surgical constraint with a weaker constraint on interventions that nevertheless does all the work the surgical constraint was designed to do. I conclude by exploring some interesting consequences of this weaker constraint for causation in psychology.
spellingShingle Kaiserman, A
Interventionism and mental surgery
title Interventionism and mental surgery
title_full Interventionism and mental surgery
title_fullStr Interventionism and mental surgery
title_full_unstemmed Interventionism and mental surgery
title_short Interventionism and mental surgery
title_sort interventionism and mental surgery
work_keys_str_mv AT kaisermana interventionismandmentalsurgery