Static Protocols and Deniability
When designing a security protocol, every choice can have far-reaching repercussions. It is therefore useful to know precisely which security goals may be achievable given the protocol structure, and which are proven impossible. In this work we present some preliminary results about static protocols...
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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2015
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| _version_ | 1797060058307100672 |
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| author | Cohn-Gordon, K |
| author_facet | Cohn-Gordon, K |
| author_sort | Cohn-Gordon, K |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | When designing a security protocol, every choice can have far-reaching repercussions. It is therefore useful to know precisely which security goals may be achievable given the protocol structure, and which are proven impossible. In this work we present some preliminary results about static protocols, whose messages do not depend on the sender's secret key, and deniable protocols, whose transcripts do not comprise proof of communication. In particular, we sketch proofs that static protocols cannot achieve explicit authentication of their peer, that they achieve deniability "or free", and that deniable protocols with explicit authentication must use a challenge-response format. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:12:16Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:2af7467a-18a5-4cd7-8a83-b103fba78f70 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:12:16Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:2af7467a-18a5-4cd7-8a83-b103fba78f702022-03-26T12:28:08ZStatic Protocols and DeniabilityWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:2af7467a-18a5-4cd7-8a83-b103fba78f70Computer securityComputingCyber SecurityEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2015Cohn-Gordon, KWhen designing a security protocol, every choice can have far-reaching repercussions. It is therefore useful to know precisely which security goals may be achievable given the protocol structure, and which are proven impossible. In this work we present some preliminary results about static protocols, whose messages do not depend on the sender's secret key, and deniable protocols, whose transcripts do not comprise proof of communication. In particular, we sketch proofs that static protocols cannot achieve explicit authentication of their peer, that they achieve deniability "or free", and that deniable protocols with explicit authentication must use a challenge-response format. |
| spellingShingle | Computer security Computing Cyber Security Cohn-Gordon, K Static Protocols and Deniability |
| title | Static Protocols and Deniability |
| title_full | Static Protocols and Deniability |
| title_fullStr | Static Protocols and Deniability |
| title_full_unstemmed | Static Protocols and Deniability |
| title_short | Static Protocols and Deniability |
| title_sort | static protocols and deniability |
| topic | Computer security Computing Cyber Security |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT cohngordonk staticprotocolsanddeniability |