Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness
<p>There is a strong intuition that conscious beings have a special kind and perhaps an especially high degree of moral significance denied to beings that lack consciousness. Though we think that the way in which this special significance is spelt out is often misleading, we think that the int...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Book section |
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Oxford University Press
2016
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| _version_ | 1826265162610376704 |
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| author | Davies, W Levy, N |
| author2 | Sinnott-Armstrong, W |
| author_facet | Sinnott-Armstrong, W Davies, W Levy, N |
| author_sort | Davies, W |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>There is a strong intuition that conscious beings have a special kind and perhaps an especially high degree of moral significance denied to beings that lack consciousness. Though we think that the way in which this special significance is spelt out is often misleading, we think that the intuition is well grounded: some kind of consciousness does make a significant difference to a being’s moral status.</p> <br/> <p>It is this intuition that explains the excitement surrounding recent work by clinicians and neuroscientists that apparently demonstrates consciousness in patients previously diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). We think that the inference from the experimental data to the presence of consciousness is too hasty. Building on recent work by Colin Klein, we will suggest that a key assumption underlying this inference is far less solid than it has appeared. Our argument casts doubt on methodologies that take command following as a marker for endogenous intentional agency, and hence for consciousness. Klein himself nonetheless accepts that these patients are conscious, although for reasons other than their apparent ability to follow basic commands. We are not convinced by Klein’s reasons for attributing consciousness, and hence adopt a more pessimistic position regarding the interpretation of the data. In closing, we shall argue that even if Klein is right and these patients do enjoy some kind of consciousness, this is not a kind of consciousness that could ground the special kind of moral status typically assigned to conscious human beings.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:19:20Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:2d437465-1932-4702-b43a-e09649678ff7 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:19:20Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:2d437465-1932-4702-b43a-e09649678ff72022-03-26T12:41:46ZPersistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousnessBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248uuid:2d437465-1932-4702-b43a-e09649678ff7Symplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2016Davies, WLevy, NSinnott-Armstrong, W<p>There is a strong intuition that conscious beings have a special kind and perhaps an especially high degree of moral significance denied to beings that lack consciousness. Though we think that the way in which this special significance is spelt out is often misleading, we think that the intuition is well grounded: some kind of consciousness does make a significant difference to a being’s moral status.</p> <br/> <p>It is this intuition that explains the excitement surrounding recent work by clinicians and neuroscientists that apparently demonstrates consciousness in patients previously diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). We think that the inference from the experimental data to the presence of consciousness is too hasty. Building on recent work by Colin Klein, we will suggest that a key assumption underlying this inference is far less solid than it has appeared. Our argument casts doubt on methodologies that take command following as a marker for endogenous intentional agency, and hence for consciousness. Klein himself nonetheless accepts that these patients are conscious, although for reasons other than their apparent ability to follow basic commands. We are not convinced by Klein’s reasons for attributing consciousness, and hence adopt a more pessimistic position regarding the interpretation of the data. In closing, we shall argue that even if Klein is right and these patients do enjoy some kind of consciousness, this is not a kind of consciousness that could ground the special kind of moral status typically assigned to conscious human beings.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Davies, W Levy, N Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| title | Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| title_full | Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| title_fullStr | Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| title_short | Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| title_sort | persistent vegetative state akinetic mutism and consciousness |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT daviesw persistentvegetativestateakineticmutismandconsciousness AT levyn persistentvegetativestateakineticmutismandconsciousness |