Introspecting knowledge
If we use “introspection” just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, then it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases. I as...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Springer
2018
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| _version_ | 1826265205015838720 |
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| author | Gibbons, JS |
| author_facet | Gibbons, JS |
| author_sort | Gibbons, JS |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | If we use “introspection” just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, then it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases. I assume there is such a thing as introspection. So I think the hard question is how it works. But can you know that you know on the basis of introspection? Well, that all depends on how introspection works. I present one account of how introspection works and argue that on that account, you can know that you know ordinary empirical things on the basis of introspection. As far as how we know about them is concerned, there’s no principled difference between the factive and non-factive mental states. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:19:59Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:2d775ad2-6d10-4822-a531-34f744ab9d20 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:19:59Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:2d775ad2-6d10-4822-a531-34f744ab9d202022-03-26T12:43:09ZIntrospecting knowledgeJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:2d775ad2-6d10-4822-a531-34f744ab9d20Symplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer2018Gibbons, JSIf we use “introspection” just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, then it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases. I assume there is such a thing as introspection. So I think the hard question is how it works. But can you know that you know on the basis of introspection? Well, that all depends on how introspection works. I present one account of how introspection works and argue that on that account, you can know that you know ordinary empirical things on the basis of introspection. As far as how we know about them is concerned, there’s no principled difference between the factive and non-factive mental states. |
| spellingShingle | Gibbons, JS Introspecting knowledge |
| title | Introspecting knowledge |
| title_full | Introspecting knowledge |
| title_fullStr | Introspecting knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed | Introspecting knowledge |
| title_short | Introspecting knowledge |
| title_sort | introspecting knowledge |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gibbonsjs introspectingknowledge |