| _version_ |
1797060667595816960
|
| collection |
OXFORD
|
| description |
Sometimes shareholders are better off delegating to a CEO with different objectives than their own. A top manager motivated to share surpluses with workers can encourage union members to adopt efficient production methods. Bond covenants may constrain managers from acquiescing to union wage demands. Nevertheless, we argue that unions can win higher wages by altering the non-shirking constraint. Resistance to monitoring leads to deadweight losses that a â€
|
| first_indexed |
2024-03-06T20:20:21Z
|
| format |
Working paper
|
| id |
oxford-uuid:2d96f15e-ce0d-4069-b9f5-1aed78a2ed0a
|
| institution |
University of Oxford
|
| last_indexed |
2024-03-06T20:20:21Z
|
| publishDate |
2003
|
| publisher |
University of Oxford
|
| record_format |
dspace
|
| spelling |
oxford-uuid:2d96f15e-ce0d-4069-b9f5-1aed78a2ed0a2022-03-26T12:43:52ZHard debt, soft CEO and union rentsWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:2d96f15e-ce0d-4069-b9f5-1aed78a2ed0aBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2003Sometimes shareholders are better off delegating to a CEO with different objectives than their own. A top manager motivated to share surpluses with workers can encourage union members to adopt efficient production methods. Bond covenants may constrain managers from acquiescing to union wage demands. Nevertheless, we argue that unions can win higher wages by altering the non-shirking constraint. Resistance to monitoring leads to deadweight losses that a â€
|
| spellingShingle |
Hard debt, soft CEO and union rents
|
| title |
Hard debt, soft CEO and union rents
|
| title_full |
Hard debt, soft CEO and union rents
|
| title_fullStr |
Hard debt, soft CEO and union rents
|
| title_full_unstemmed |
Hard debt, soft CEO and union rents
|
| title_short |
Hard debt, soft CEO and union rents
|
| title_sort |
hard debt soft ceo and union rents
|