| Summary: | <p>This research is a multimethod investigation into the drivers of spatial variation in public spending in hegemonic party systems. It challenges the narrow electoral focus of the distributive politics literature on vote buying to address the important question of “who gets what”, and unpacks the politics of it. Rather, it identifies two conditions salient to authoritarian regime persistence, and can in turn reshape the geography of public resource allocation in hegemonic party autocracies. These two conditions are the attainment of positive economic growth to earn performance legitimacy and the preclusion of threats of contentious collective actions. </p> <p>In this research I argue that, by aiming to attain performance legitimacy, autocrats will seek to develop the economy in order to convince citizens of their political and economic mandates. To this end, they will nurture mutually beneficial relationships with a group of crony capitalists who can support the state in formulating and implementing its economic policies. Those business cronies, in return, will enjoy disproportionate access to scarce public resources which will be allocated to districts where they want to expand their businesses. Moreover, I make a case for the effect of contentious politics on the distribution of public resources. To consolidate political power, autocrats will attempt to buy off aggrieved actors who have strong capacity for undertaking collective action. The more organised and resourceful aggrieved actors are, the better the bargain they can strike with the state to accede to their demands for collective consumption services. The argument presented in this research is illuminated through the case of Egypt under Mubarak. It is based on a mixed-methods design and draws on 50 elite interviews, policy documents, minutes of parliament and regression analysis.</p>
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