Slow persuasion
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Usin...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2022
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| _version_ | 1797109450044080128 |
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| author | Escude, M Sinander, L |
| author_facet | Escude, M Sinander, L |
| author_sort | Escude, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel `viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:42:04Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:2f9172db-4b65-41a0-b97b-81abfca2fb49 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:42:04Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:2f9172db-4b65-41a0-b97b-81abfca2fb492023-05-10T12:01:22ZSlow persuasionJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:2f9172db-4b65-41a0-b97b-81abfca2fb49EnglishSymplectic ElementsWiley2022Escude, MSinander, LWhat are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel `viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs. |
| spellingShingle | Escude, M Sinander, L Slow persuasion |
| title | Slow persuasion |
| title_full | Slow persuasion |
| title_fullStr | Slow persuasion |
| title_full_unstemmed | Slow persuasion |
| title_short | Slow persuasion |
| title_sort | slow persuasion |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT escudem slowpersuasion AT sinanderl slowpersuasion |