Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.

The paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements--moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria--in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guara...

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Auteurs principaux: Irwin, G, Vines, D
Format: Journal article
Langue:English
Publié: 2003
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author Irwin, G
Vines, D
author_facet Irwin, G
Vines, D
author_sort Irwin, G
collection OXFORD
description The paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements--moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria--in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guarantees to the financial sector. The model has a unique long-run equilibrium with overinvestment. But in the short run, in which the capital stock is fixed, there may be multiple equilibria. In a crisis the government is forced to renege on its guarantees; the effect is a rapid reversal of foreign capital flows.
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spelling oxford-uuid:307ca73d-43d1-450f-b5fb-85490cb817762022-03-26T13:01:41ZGovernment Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:307ca73d-43d1-450f-b5fb-85490cb81776EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2003Irwin, GVines, DThe paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements--moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria--in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guarantees to the financial sector. The model has a unique long-run equilibrium with overinvestment. But in the short run, in which the capital stock is fixed, there may be multiple equilibria. In a crisis the government is forced to renege on its guarantees; the effect is a rapid reversal of foreign capital flows.
spellingShingle Irwin, G
Vines, D
Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
title Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
title_full Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
title_fullStr Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
title_full_unstemmed Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
title_short Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
title_sort government guarantees investment and vulnerability to financial crises
work_keys_str_mv AT irwing governmentguaranteesinvestmentandvulnerabilitytofinancialcrises
AT vinesd governmentguaranteesinvestmentandvulnerabilitytofinancialcrises