Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.
The paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements--moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria--in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guara...
Auteurs principaux: | , |
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Format: | Journal article |
Langue: | English |
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2003
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author | Irwin, G Vines, D |
author_facet | Irwin, G Vines, D |
author_sort | Irwin, G |
collection | OXFORD |
description | The paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements--moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria--in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guarantees to the financial sector. The model has a unique long-run equilibrium with overinvestment. But in the short run, in which the capital stock is fixed, there may be multiple equilibria. In a crisis the government is forced to renege on its guarantees; the effect is a rapid reversal of foreign capital flows. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:29:14Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:307ca73d-43d1-450f-b5fb-85490cb81776 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:29:14Z |
publishDate | 2003 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:307ca73d-43d1-450f-b5fb-85490cb817762022-03-26T13:01:41ZGovernment Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:307ca73d-43d1-450f-b5fb-85490cb81776EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2003Irwin, GVines, DThe paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements--moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria--in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guarantees to the financial sector. The model has a unique long-run equilibrium with overinvestment. But in the short run, in which the capital stock is fixed, there may be multiple equilibria. In a crisis the government is forced to renege on its guarantees; the effect is a rapid reversal of foreign capital flows. |
spellingShingle | Irwin, G Vines, D Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises. |
title | Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises. |
title_full | Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises. |
title_fullStr | Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises. |
title_full_unstemmed | Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises. |
title_short | Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises. |
title_sort | government guarantees investment and vulnerability to financial crises |
work_keys_str_mv | AT irwing governmentguaranteesinvestmentandvulnerabilitytofinancialcrises AT vinesd governmentguaranteesinvestmentandvulnerabilitytofinancialcrises |