Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks
In this paper we investigate the effects of regulatory policies on troubled banks. In our analysis banks' portfolio decisions are unobservable and are made by management. Management's decisions are influenced by the compensation and intervention policies of shareholders and regulators as w...
Główni autorzy: | Noe, T, Rebello, M, Wall, L |
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Format: | Journal article |
Wydane: |
1996
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