Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks
In this paper we investigate the effects of regulatory policies on troubled banks. In our analysis banks' portfolio decisions are unobservable and are made by management. Management's decisions are influenced by the compensation and intervention policies of shareholders and regulators as w...
主要な著者: | Noe, T, Rebello, M, Wall, L |
---|---|
フォーマット: | Journal article |
出版事項: |
1996
|
類似資料
-
Rent division, restructuring and managerial risk taking: A strategic bargaining model
著者:: Noe, T, 等
出版事項: (1993) -
A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents
著者:: Lambrecht, Bart M., 等
出版事項: (2014) -
Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
著者:: Noe, T, 等
出版事項: (1997) -
Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
著者:: Noe, T, 等
出版事項: (1997) -
Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism, nancing, and payout polices
著者:: Noe, T, 等
出版事項: (1996)