| Summary: | In this paper we explain why the modern corporation may persist with a decentralized system of plants differentiated by the vintage of capital and the style of management. Our goal is to show how and why firms are, at once, structured by the inherited configuration of capital and also reproduce differentiation within and outside the corporation. To do so, we use concepts and principles drawn from modern financial theory to show that a spatially differentiated configuration of production may have advantages for the firm in terms of the risk-adjusted flow of revenue, strategic options in relation to actual and potential competitors, and the management of sunk costs. Our argument focuses on the modern corporation, characterized by a separation between ownership and control as well as a dependence upon internal stakeholders for the realization of planned revenue and output targets. We argue that our framework can help theorists account for the persistence of interfirm and interindustry differences in capital profiles, despite a common presumption in favor of convergence around a simple, efficient industry standard. While the paper is an exercise in theory, it is based upon our previously published studies of corporate restructuring in manufacturing and retail industries in the United States and the United Kingdom.
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