Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding.
Interdiction of terrorist funds is a priority for intergovernmental cooperation. However, multilateral and unilateral attempts to ensure timely reporting of transactions made by targeted individuals or groups, and to deny them access to the international financial system, have had limited success. T...
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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2004
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author | FitzGerald, V |
author_facet | FitzGerald, V |
author_sort | FitzGerald, V |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Interdiction of terrorist funds is a priority for intergovernmental cooperation. However, multilateral and unilateral attempts to ensure timely reporting of transactions made by targeted individuals or groups, and to deny them access to the international financial system, have had limited success. This is mainly due to economic disincentives for the disclosure of the identity and purpose of transacting agents, particularly those using correspondent banking services, informal money transfer networks (MTNs) and offshore financial centres (OFCs). This paper proposes that solutions should be based on positive incentives for disclosure, and could include trans-border withholding taxes on transactions with unregulated clients and the provision of affordable transfer systems for emigrants. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:42:21Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:34b333d5-3405-4c6a-9aeb-0db950d9920b |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:42:21Z |
publishDate | 2004 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:34b333d5-3405-4c6a-9aeb-0db950d9920b2022-03-26T13:27:34ZGlobal Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:34b333d5-3405-4c6a-9aeb-0db950d9920bEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2004FitzGerald, VInterdiction of terrorist funds is a priority for intergovernmental cooperation. However, multilateral and unilateral attempts to ensure timely reporting of transactions made by targeted individuals or groups, and to deny them access to the international financial system, have had limited success. This is mainly due to economic disincentives for the disclosure of the identity and purpose of transacting agents, particularly those using correspondent banking services, informal money transfer networks (MTNs) and offshore financial centres (OFCs). This paper proposes that solutions should be based on positive incentives for disclosure, and could include trans-border withholding taxes on transactions with unregulated clients and the provision of affordable transfer systems for emigrants. |
spellingShingle | FitzGerald, V Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding. |
title | Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding. |
title_full | Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding. |
title_fullStr | Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding. |
title_full_unstemmed | Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding. |
title_short | Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist Funding. |
title_sort | global financial information compliance incentives and terrorist funding |
work_keys_str_mv | AT fitzgeraldv globalfinancialinformationcomplianceincentivesandterroristfunding |