Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth
In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing asserti...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2023
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| _version_ | 1826314846108385280 |
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| author | Teichmann, R |
| author_facet | Teichmann, R |
| author_sort | Teichmann, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of assertion (and lying) is for various reasons mistaken. A consequence of Williams’s approach is that ‘Shall I tell the truth here?’ is presented as a much more open question for an agent than it possibly can be. Only by adverting to the language-game presupposed by that question’s having any sense at all can we arrive at a fair picture of when and how the answer ‘No’ might be reasonable. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:16:44Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:3542269f-b495-441d-8b17-340059dcdcc2 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:14:36Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:3542269f-b495-441d-8b17-340059dcdcc22024-10-16T09:41:21ZAssertion, Lying and the Norm of TruthJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:3542269f-b495-441d-8b17-340059dcdcc2EnglishJisc Publications RouterSpringer2023Teichmann, RIn chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of assertion (and lying) is for various reasons mistaken. A consequence of Williams’s approach is that ‘Shall I tell the truth here?’ is presented as a much more open question for an agent than it possibly can be. Only by adverting to the language-game presupposed by that question’s having any sense at all can we arrive at a fair picture of when and how the answer ‘No’ might be reasonable. |
| spellingShingle | Teichmann, R Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth |
| title | Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth |
| title_full | Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth |
| title_fullStr | Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth |
| title_short | Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth |
| title_sort | assertion lying and the norm of truth |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT teichmannr assertionlyingandthenormoftruth |