Biased policy professionals
Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a nov...
Main Authors: | , , |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2019
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author | Banuri, S Dercon, S Gauri, V |
author_facet | Banuri, S Dercon, S Gauri, V |
author_sort | Banuri, S |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:48:56Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:36e916cf-24bf-4131-bd8c-c1b4919f72b4 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:48:56Z |
publishDate | 2019 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:36e916cf-24bf-4131-bd8c-c1b4919f72b42022-03-26T13:40:47ZBiased policy professionalsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:36e916cf-24bf-4131-bd8c-c1b4919f72b4EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2019Banuri, SDercon, SGauri, VAlthough the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases. |
spellingShingle | Banuri, S Dercon, S Gauri, V Biased policy professionals |
title | Biased policy professionals |
title_full | Biased policy professionals |
title_fullStr | Biased policy professionals |
title_full_unstemmed | Biased policy professionals |
title_short | Biased policy professionals |
title_sort | biased policy professionals |
work_keys_str_mv | AT banuris biasedpolicyprofessionals AT dercons biasedpolicyprofessionals AT gauriv biasedpolicyprofessionals |