Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please?
Since Parfit (1984), philosophers have standardly held there are three theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desire theories, and the objective list. Some have argued this classification omits a distinct, plausible theory of wellbeing based on life satisfaction. The life satisfaction theory (LST) is nota...
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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Wellbeing Research Centre
2023
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| _version_ | 1797111467531567104 |
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| author | Plant, M |
| author_facet | Plant, M |
| author_sort | Plant, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Since Parfit (1984), philosophers have standardly held there are three theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desire theories, and the objective list. Some have argued this classification omits a distinct, plausible theory of wellbeing based on life satisfaction. The life satisfaction theory (LST) is notably prominent outside philosophy, with a growing chorus advocating for self-reported life satisfaction to be a, or the, outcome measure for policymaking. In this paper, I investigate the nature and plausibility of LST. I argue that while happiness and life satisfaction are often conflated, LST is best understood as a type of desire theory and not as a distinct account of wellbeing. To evaluate LST, I initially consider two current objections and argue they are little threat. I then present two seriously troubling objections. One is whimsicality: LST implies subjects can determine how well or badly their lives are going for any reason and at any time. The other that it leaves us with too few subjects: it means that, for entities who cannot make whole-life evaluations, such as infants and many animals, nothing can go better or worse for them. I conclude (1) the life satisfaction theory is implausible (but do not argue for an alternative here) and (2) life satisfaction surveys are a useful, but non-ideal measure of wellbeing; we should remain open to, and explore the implications of, other metrics. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:10:49Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:3a75e2b7-bfcf-4239-8d70-4f8523fd3817 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:10:49Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Wellbeing Research Centre |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:3a75e2b7-bfcf-4239-8d70-4f8523fd38172023-11-28T10:57:46ZCan I get a little less life satisfaction, please?Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:3a75e2b7-bfcf-4239-8d70-4f8523fd3817EnglishSymplectic ElementsWellbeing Research Centre2023Plant, MSince Parfit (1984), philosophers have standardly held there are three theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desire theories, and the objective list. Some have argued this classification omits a distinct, plausible theory of wellbeing based on life satisfaction. The life satisfaction theory (LST) is notably prominent outside philosophy, with a growing chorus advocating for self-reported life satisfaction to be a, or the, outcome measure for policymaking. In this paper, I investigate the nature and plausibility of LST. I argue that while happiness and life satisfaction are often conflated, LST is best understood as a type of desire theory and not as a distinct account of wellbeing. To evaluate LST, I initially consider two current objections and argue they are little threat. I then present two seriously troubling objections. One is whimsicality: LST implies subjects can determine how well or badly their lives are going for any reason and at any time. The other that it leaves us with too few subjects: it means that, for entities who cannot make whole-life evaluations, such as infants and many animals, nothing can go better or worse for them. I conclude (1) the life satisfaction theory is implausible (but do not argue for an alternative here) and (2) life satisfaction surveys are a useful, but non-ideal measure of wellbeing; we should remain open to, and explore the implications of, other metrics. |
| spellingShingle | Plant, M Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please? |
| title | Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please? |
| title_full | Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please? |
| title_fullStr | Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please? |
| title_short | Can I get a little less life satisfaction, please? |
| title_sort | can i get a little less life satisfaction please |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT plantm canigetalittlelesslifesatisfactionplease |