Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism

This paper examines James Frederick Ferrier’s idealist argument against the realist agnosticism of William Hamilton, of the Scottish ‘common sense’ school. Particular attention is paid to Ferrier’s restricted definition of ignorance as pertaining only to what could be known, and to his claim that co...

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Main Author: Mander, W
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2015
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author Mander, W
author_facet Mander, W
author_sort Mander, W
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description This paper examines James Frederick Ferrier’s idealist argument against the realist agnosticism of William Hamilton, of the Scottish ‘common sense’ school. Particular attention is paid to Ferrier’s restricted definition of ignorance as pertaining only to what could be known, and to his claim that consciousness in itself (sans objects) and objects in themselves (sans awareness) are contradictory or unintelligible notions. The matter commands attention, in the first place, because this once-important debate has become virtually lost from philosophical memory due to the rapid decline in reputation that both philosophers suffered after their deaths. But secondly, it is worth thinking about for the light it sheds on the origins of the British Idealist movement which followed it.
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spelling oxford-uuid:3ab35862-1320-4be2-a5c1-39da113ae2122022-03-26T14:03:05ZFerrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealismJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:3ab35862-1320-4be2-a5c1-39da113ae212EnglishORA DepositDe Gruyter2015Mander, WThis paper examines James Frederick Ferrier’s idealist argument against the realist agnosticism of William Hamilton, of the Scottish ‘common sense’ school. Particular attention is paid to Ferrier’s restricted definition of ignorance as pertaining only to what could be known, and to his claim that consciousness in itself (sans objects) and objects in themselves (sans awareness) are contradictory or unintelligible notions. The matter commands attention, in the first place, because this once-important debate has become virtually lost from philosophical memory due to the rapid decline in reputation that both philosophers suffered after their deaths. But secondly, it is worth thinking about for the light it sheds on the origins of the British Idealist movement which followed it.
spellingShingle Mander, W
Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism
title Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism
title_full Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism
title_fullStr Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism
title_full_unstemmed Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism
title_short Ferrier, the unknowable and the origins of idealism
title_sort ferrier the unknowable and the origins of idealism
work_keys_str_mv AT manderw ferriertheunknowableandtheoriginsofidealism