An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
We study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to t...
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| Format: | Conference item |
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Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2012
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| author | Caragiannis, I Filos-Ratsikas, A Procaccia, A |
| author_facet | Caragiannis, I Filos-Ratsikas, A Procaccia, A |
| author_sort | Caragiannis, I |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to the maximum cardinality matching. This is an improvement over a recent upper bound of 2 [Ashlagi et al., EC 2010] and, furthermore, our mechanism beats for the first time the lower bound on the approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms. We complement our positive result with new lower bounds. Among other statements, we prove that the weaker incentive compatibility property of truthfulness in expectation in our mechanism is necessary; universally truthful mechanisms that have an inclusion-maximality property have an approximation ratio of at least 2. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:03:51Z |
| format | Conference item |
| id | oxford-uuid:3bca2112-dcb3-4f7e-aea0-bf9a4e3a0ab3 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:03:51Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:3bca2112-dcb3-4f7e-aea0-bf9a4e3a0ab32022-03-26T14:09:39ZAn improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanismConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:3bca2112-dcb3-4f7e-aea0-bf9a4e3a0ab3Symplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Berlin Heidelberg2012Caragiannis, IFilos-Ratsikas, AProcaccia, AWe study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to the maximum cardinality matching. This is an improvement over a recent upper bound of 2 [Ashlagi et al., EC 2010] and, furthermore, our mechanism beats for the first time the lower bound on the approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms. We complement our positive result with new lower bounds. Among other statements, we prove that the weaker incentive compatibility property of truthfulness in expectation in our mechanism is necessary; universally truthful mechanisms that have an inclusion-maximality property have an approximation ratio of at least 2. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. |
| spellingShingle | Caragiannis, I Filos-Ratsikas, A Procaccia, A An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| title | An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| title_full | An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| title_fullStr | An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| title_full_unstemmed | An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| title_short | An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| title_sort | improved 2 agent kidney exchange mechanism |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT caragiannisi animproved2agentkidneyexchangemechanism AT filosratsikasa animproved2agentkidneyexchangemechanism AT procacciaa animproved2agentkidneyexchangemechanism AT caragiannisi improved2agentkidneyexchangemechanism AT filosratsikasa improved2agentkidneyexchangemechanism AT procacciaa improved2agentkidneyexchangemechanism |