An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
We study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to t...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Caragiannis, I, Filos-Ratsikas, A, Procaccia, A |
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Μορφή: | Conference item |
Έκδοση: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2012
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Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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