What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice.
In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the student...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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American Economic Association
2008
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| _version_ | 1797063734317809664 |
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| author | Erdil, A Ergin, H |
| author_facet | Erdil, A Ergin, H |
| author_sort | Erdil, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:04:09Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:3be3d3d1-ee8d-4f97-b3f0-f51066e28796 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:04:09Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:3be3d3d1-ee8d-4f97-b3f0-f51066e287962022-03-26T14:10:11ZWhat's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:3be3d3d1-ee8d-4f97-b3f0-f51066e28796EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsAmerican Economic Association2008Erdil, AErgin, HIn several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism. |
| spellingShingle | Erdil, A Ergin, H What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. |
| title | What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. |
| title_full | What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. |
| title_fullStr | What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. |
| title_full_unstemmed | What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. |
| title_short | What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. |
| title_sort | what s the matter with tie breaking improving efficiency in school choice |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT erdila whatsthematterwithtiebreakingimprovingefficiencyinschoolchoice AT erginh whatsthematterwithtiebreakingimprovingefficiencyinschoolchoice |