Desert and inequity aversion in teams
Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived ent...
| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , |
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| التنسيق: | Working paper |
| منشور في: |
University of Oxford
2011
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| _version_ | 1826268384917979136 |
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| author | Gill, D Stone, R |
| author_facet | Gill, D Stone, R |
| author_sort | Gill, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:08:52Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:3d723fc7-39a4-4772-8b9f-dd2e9addce37 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:08:52Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:3d723fc7-39a4-4772-8b9f-dd2e9addce372022-03-26T14:19:22ZDesert and inequity aversion in teamsWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:3d723fc7-39a4-4772-8b9f-dd2e9addce37Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2011Gill, DStone, RTeams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation. |
| spellingShingle | Gill, D Stone, R Desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| title | Desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| title_full | Desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| title_fullStr | Desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| title_full_unstemmed | Desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| title_short | Desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| title_sort | desert and inequity aversion in teams |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gilld desertandinequityaversioninteams AT stoner desertandinequityaversioninteams |