Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought

While much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, an...

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Main Author: Christopher Fowles
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Taylor and Francis 2018
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author Christopher Fowles
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description While much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.
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spelling oxford-uuid:3db7d07f-a494-453b-8257-3a4c7aa93f612022-03-26T14:21:05ZNietzsche on conscious and unconscious thoughtJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:3db7d07f-a494-453b-8257-3a4c7aa93f61EnglishSymplectic ElementsTaylor and Francis2018Christopher FowlesWhile much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.
spellingShingle Christopher Fowles
Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
title Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
title_full Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
title_fullStr Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
title_full_unstemmed Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
title_short Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
title_sort nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
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