Dependence and uniqueness in Bayesian games
This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not...
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2012
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| Summary: | This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas. |
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