Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture.
Survey data suggest that cropsharing contracts exhibit a much higher degree of uniformity than is warranted by economic fundamentals. We propose a dynamic model of contract choice to explain this phenomenon. Landowners and tenants recontract periodically, taking into account expected returns as well...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2001
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| _version_ | 1797064337073897472 |
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| author | Young, H Burke, M |
| author_facet | Young, H Burke, M |
| author_sort | Young, H |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Survey data suggest that cropsharing contracts exhibit a much higher degree of uniformity than is warranted by economic fundamentals. We propose a dynamic model of contract choice to explain this phenomenon. Landowners and tenants recontract periodically, taking into account expected returns as well as conformity with local practice. The resulting stochastic dynamical system is studied using techniques from statistical mechanics. The most likely states consist of patches where contractual terms are nearly uniform, separated by boundaries where the terms shift abruptly. These and other predictions of the model are borne out by survey data on agricultural contracts in Illinois. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:12:49Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:3ec29b12-19c6-4f42-8e73-2dd74e0bbbe3 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:12:49Z |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:3ec29b12-19c6-4f42-8e73-2dd74e0bbbe32022-03-26T14:27:30ZCompetition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:3ec29b12-19c6-4f42-8e73-2dd74e0bbbe3EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2001Young, HBurke, MSurvey data suggest that cropsharing contracts exhibit a much higher degree of uniformity than is warranted by economic fundamentals. We propose a dynamic model of contract choice to explain this phenomenon. Landowners and tenants recontract periodically, taking into account expected returns as well as conformity with local practice. The resulting stochastic dynamical system is studied using techniques from statistical mechanics. The most likely states consist of patches where contractual terms are nearly uniform, separated by boundaries where the terms shift abruptly. These and other predictions of the model are borne out by survey data on agricultural contracts in Illinois. |
| spellingShingle | Young, H Burke, M Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. |
| title | Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. |
| title_full | Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. |
| title_fullStr | Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. |
| title_short | Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. |
| title_sort | competition and custom in economic contracts a case study of illinois agriculture |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT youngh competitionandcustomineconomiccontractsacasestudyofillinoisagriculture AT burkem competitionandcustomineconomiccontractsacasestudyofillinoisagriculture |