Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm

We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a “displacement externality” under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hellmann, T, Thiele, V
Format: Journal article
Published: American Economic Association 2017
_version_ 1826268881375723520
author Hellmann, T
Thiele, V
author_facet Hellmann, T
Thiele, V
author_sort Hellmann, T
collection OXFORD
description We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a “displacement externality” under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a “retention externality” under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more and retention externalities less, so that integration becomes more attractive. Our model also shows that wealthy partners would want to commit to ex-post wealth constraints.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T21:16:22Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:3fedb572-ba6a-4fc2-9a45-30b839b3a82a
institution University of Oxford
last_indexed 2024-03-06T21:16:22Z
publishDate 2017
publisher American Economic Association
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:3fedb572-ba6a-4fc2-9a45-30b839b3a82a2022-03-26T14:34:56ZPartner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firmJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:3fedb572-ba6a-4fc2-9a45-30b839b3a82aSymplectic Elements at OxfordAmerican Economic Association2017Hellmann, TThiele, VWe develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a “displacement externality” under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a “retention externality” under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more and retention externalities less, so that integration becomes more attractive. Our model also shows that wealthy partners would want to commit to ex-post wealth constraints.
spellingShingle Hellmann, T
Thiele, V
Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
title Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
title_full Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
title_fullStr Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
title_full_unstemmed Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
title_short Partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
title_sort partner uncertainty and the dynamic boundary of the firm
work_keys_str_mv AT hellmannt partneruncertaintyandthedynamicboundaryofthefirm
AT thielev partneruncertaintyandthedynamicboundaryofthefirm