Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking
Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclus...
| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Định dạng: | Journal article |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Blackwell Publishing Inc.
2002
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| Những chủ đề: |
| _version_ | 1826269070725480448 |
|---|---|
| author | Dorr, C |
| author_facet | Dorr, C |
| author_sort | Dorr, C |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:19:18Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:40e42a69-e399-4f85-a2af-3832b8f82e9c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:19:18Z |
| publishDate | 2002 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing Inc. |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:40e42a69-e399-4f85-a2af-3832b8f82e9c2022-03-26T14:40:27ZNon-cognitivism and wishful thinkingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:40e42a69-e399-4f85-a2af-3832b8f82e9cEthics (Moral philosophy)EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetBlackwell Publishing Inc.2002Dorr, CEven if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises. |
| spellingShingle | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Dorr, C Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| title | Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| title_full | Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| title_fullStr | Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| title_full_unstemmed | Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| title_short | Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| title_sort | non cognitivism and wishful thinking |
| topic | Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dorrc noncognitivismandwishfulthinking |