Strict finitism refuted?

In his paper 'Wang's Paradox', Michael Dummett provides an argument for why strict finitism in mathematics is internally inconsistent and therefore an untenable position. Dummett's argument proceeds by making two claims: (1) Strict finitism is committed to the claim that there ar...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Magidor, O
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 2007
_version_ 1797065145730465792
author Magidor, O
author_facet Magidor, O
author_sort Magidor, O
collection OXFORD
description In his paper 'Wang's Paradox', Michael Dummett provides an argument for why strict finitism in mathematics is internally inconsistent and therefore an untenable position. Dummett's argument proceeds by making two claims: (1) Strict finitism is committed to the claim that there are sets of natural numbers which are closed under the successor operation but nonetheless have an upper bound; (2) Such a commitment is inconsistent, even by finitistic standards. In this paper I claim that Dummett's argument fails. I question both parts of Dummett's argument, but most importantly I claim that Dummett's argument in favour of the second claim crucially relies on an implicit assumption that Dummett does not acknowledge and that the strict finitist need not accept. ©2007 The Aristotelian Society.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T21:24:28Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:429aa918-37ec-4e7e-9640-6b68ef5bd1ac
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-06T21:24:28Z
publishDate 2007
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:429aa918-37ec-4e7e-9640-6b68ef5bd1ac2022-03-26T14:50:28ZStrict finitism refuted?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:429aa918-37ec-4e7e-9640-6b68ef5bd1acEnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2007Magidor, OIn his paper 'Wang's Paradox', Michael Dummett provides an argument for why strict finitism in mathematics is internally inconsistent and therefore an untenable position. Dummett's argument proceeds by making two claims: (1) Strict finitism is committed to the claim that there are sets of natural numbers which are closed under the successor operation but nonetheless have an upper bound; (2) Such a commitment is inconsistent, even by finitistic standards. In this paper I claim that Dummett's argument fails. I question both parts of Dummett's argument, but most importantly I claim that Dummett's argument in favour of the second claim crucially relies on an implicit assumption that Dummett does not acknowledge and that the strict finitist need not accept. ©2007 The Aristotelian Society.
spellingShingle Magidor, O
Strict finitism refuted?
title Strict finitism refuted?
title_full Strict finitism refuted?
title_fullStr Strict finitism refuted?
title_full_unstemmed Strict finitism refuted?
title_short Strict finitism refuted?
title_sort strict finitism refuted
work_keys_str_mv AT magidoro strictfinitismrefuted