Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion

In this article, the authors show that the evolution of managerial entrenchment can distort investment horizons. Both myopic and hypermetropic distortions can arise. The direction of these distortions is determined by the locus of control and their pervasiveness by the degree of management entrenchm...

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Main Authors: Noe, T, Rebello, M
Format: Journal article
Published: 1997
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author Noe, T
Rebello, M
author_facet Noe, T
Rebello, M
author_sort Noe, T
collection OXFORD
description In this article, the authors show that the evolution of managerial entrenchment can distort investment horizons. Both myopic and hypermetropic distortions can arise. The direction of these distortions is determined by the locus of control and their pervasiveness by the degree of management entrenchment. Myopic distortions occur when shareholders directly determine investment policy. Hypermetropic distortions occur when management sets investment policy. The inherent hypermetropic bias of managers is mitigated by front-loaded compensation packages and pension plans tied to short-run performance. These distortions in investment horizons may have implications for the allocation of corporate control.
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spelling oxford-uuid:43a5e375-1c92-47bc-b0c4-64f82cbd3c482022-03-26T14:56:41ZRenegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretionJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:43a5e375-1c92-47bc-b0c4-64f82cbd3c48Saïd Business School - Eureka1997Noe, TRebello, MIn this article, the authors show that the evolution of managerial entrenchment can distort investment horizons. Both myopic and hypermetropic distortions can arise. The direction of these distortions is determined by the locus of control and their pervasiveness by the degree of management entrenchment. Myopic distortions occur when shareholders directly determine investment policy. Hypermetropic distortions occur when management sets investment policy. The inherent hypermetropic bias of managers is mitigated by front-loaded compensation packages and pension plans tied to short-run performance. These distortions in investment horizons may have implications for the allocation of corporate control.
spellingShingle Noe, T
Rebello, M
Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
title Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
title_full Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
title_fullStr Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
title_full_unstemmed Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
title_short Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion
title_sort renegotiation investment horizons and managerial discretion
work_keys_str_mv AT noet renegotiationinvestmenthorizonsandmanagerialdiscretion
AT rebellom renegotiationinvestmenthorizonsandmanagerialdiscretion