EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE
Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have indepen...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2009
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| _version_ | 1826269633740537856 |
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| author | Bykvist, K Olson, J |
| author_facet | Bykvist, K Olson, J |
| author_sort | Bykvist, K |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that 'purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. © 2008 The Authors. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:28:07Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:43c6ead9-327e-4bf0-92c5-c7aa1fed18cd |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:28:07Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:43c6ead9-327e-4bf0-92c5-c7aa1fed18cd2022-03-26T14:57:33ZEXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDEJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:43c6ead9-327e-4bf0-92c5-c7aa1fed18cdEnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2009Bykvist, KOlson, JMichael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that 'purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. © 2008 The Authors. |
| spellingShingle | Bykvist, K Olson, J EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE |
| title | EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE |
| title_full | EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE |
| title_fullStr | EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE |
| title_full_unstemmed | EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE |
| title_short | EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE |
| title_sort | expressivism and moral certitude |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bykvistk expressivismandmoralcertitude AT olsonj expressivismandmoralcertitude |