Unemployment insurance in transition and developing countries: moral hazard vs. liquidity constraints in Chile
One of the most complex policy issues that developing countries will face as a result of the employment crisis caused by the Covid crisis is the question of how they can better protect the unemployed. However, the analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) in developing economies with large informal se...
Main Authors: | Sehnbruch, K, Carranza Navarrete, R, Contreras Guajardo, D |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Taylor & Francis
2022
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