Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers
With public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality. This paper...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2018
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| _version_ | 1797065553214439424 |
|---|---|
| author | Besley, T Malcomson, J |
| author_facet | Besley, T Malcomson, J |
| author_sort | Besley, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | With public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality. This paper explores the implications of entry by for-profit providers when there is unobserved quality. The model generates three key policy-relevant insights. First, by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely. Second, it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not-for-profit as an active provider. Third, it characterizes the optimal payment (or voucher value) to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:30:15Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:44754dc7-ef2a-4827-aa07-7fcf23944f57 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:30:15Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:44754dc7-ef2a-4827-aa07-7fcf23944f572022-03-26T15:01:40ZCompetition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providersJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:44754dc7-ef2a-4827-aa07-7fcf23944f57EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2018Besley, TMalcomson, JWith public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality. This paper explores the implications of entry by for-profit providers when there is unobserved quality. The model generates three key policy-relevant insights. First, by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely. Second, it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not-for-profit as an active provider. Third, it characterizes the optimal payment (or voucher value) to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically. |
| spellingShingle | Besley, T Malcomson, J Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers |
| title | Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers |
| title_full | Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers |
| title_fullStr | Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers |
| title_short | Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers |
| title_sort | competition in public service provision the role of not for profit providers |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT besleyt competitioninpublicserviceprovisiontheroleofnotforprofitproviders AT malcomsonj competitioninpublicserviceprovisiontheroleofnotforprofitproviders |