Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions
Suggests a reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete; postulates a simple adaptive learning process; and applies this framework to the study of social and economic institutions. Discusses learning; dynamic and stochastic stability; adaptive lear...
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Princeton University Press
1998
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| Summary: | Suggests a reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete; postulates a simple adaptive learning process; and applies this framework to the study of social and economic institutions. Discusses learning; dynamic and stochastic stability; adaptive learning in small games; variations on the learning process; local interaction; equilibrium and disequilibrium selection in general games; bargaining; and contracts. Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University. Bibliography; index. |
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