Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions
Suggests a reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete; postulates a simple adaptive learning process; and applies this framework to the study of social and economic institutions. Discusses learning; dynamic and stochastic stability; adaptive lear...
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Princeton University Press
1998
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| _version_ | 1797065642133684224 |
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| author | Young, H |
| author_facet | Young, H |
| author_sort | Young, H |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Suggests a reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete; postulates a simple adaptive learning process; and applies this framework to the study of social and economic institutions. Discusses learning; dynamic and stochastic stability; adaptive learning in small games; variations on the learning process; local interaction; equilibrium and disequilibrium selection in general games; bargaining; and contracts. Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University. Bibliography; index. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:31:29Z |
| format | Book |
| id | oxford-uuid:44d1f985-72f7-4a47-ad3f-d996f80d70af |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:31:29Z |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:44d1f985-72f7-4a47-ad3f-d996f80d70af2022-03-26T15:03:58ZIndividual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutionsBookhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33uuid:44d1f985-72f7-4a47-ad3f-d996f80d70afEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsPrinceton University Press1998Young, HSuggests a reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete; postulates a simple adaptive learning process; and applies this framework to the study of social and economic institutions. Discusses learning; dynamic and stochastic stability; adaptive learning in small games; variations on the learning process; local interaction; equilibrium and disequilibrium selection in general games; bargaining; and contracts. Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University. Bibliography; index. |
| spellingShingle | Young, H Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions |
| title | Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions |
| title_full | Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions |
| title_fullStr | Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions |
| title_short | Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions |
| title_sort | individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT youngh individualstrategyandsocialstructureanevolutionarytheoryofinstitutions |