The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
In infinitely repeated games, Nachbar (1997, 2005) has shown that Bayesian learning of a restricted strategy set is inconsistent; the beliefs required to learn any element of such a set will lead best responses to lie outside of it in most games. But I establish here that Nash convergence of Bayesia...
मुख्य लेखक: | Norman, TWL |
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स्वरूप: | Journal article |
भाषा: | English |
प्रकाशित: |
Elsevier BV
2022
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