First-order logics for comparative similarity
If we speak of degrees of similarity, what kinds of judgment are we assuming to make sense? It will be argued that the necessary and sufficient condition for there to be degrees of similarity is that there should be a four-termed relation of comparative similarity — w resembles x at least as much as...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Duke University Press
1988
|
| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1797066126497153024 |
|---|---|
| author | Williamson, T |
| author2 | University of Notre Dame |
| author_facet | University of Notre Dame Williamson, T |
| author_sort | Williamson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | If we speak of degrees of similarity, what kinds of judgment are we assuming to make sense? It will be argued that the necessary and sufficient condition for there to be degrees of similarity is that there should be a four-termed relation of comparative similarity — w resembles x at least as much as y resembles z—obeying certain constraints. Of course, nothing turns on how we use the words 'degree of similarity'. Rather, the point is to distinguish the different levels of ideologicalcommitment (in Quine's sense) which different kinds of judgment of similarity involve. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:37:56Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:46e7a0ed-1863-4972-a8e1-dde85386d138 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:37:56Z |
| publishDate | 1988 |
| publisher | Duke University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:46e7a0ed-1863-4972-a8e1-dde85386d1382022-03-26T15:16:47ZFirst-order logics for comparative similarityJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:46e7a0ed-1863-4972-a8e1-dde85386d138PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDuke University Press1988Williamson, TUniversity of Notre DameIf we speak of degrees of similarity, what kinds of judgment are we assuming to make sense? It will be argued that the necessary and sufficient condition for there to be degrees of similarity is that there should be a four-termed relation of comparative similarity — w resembles x at least as much as y resembles z—obeying certain constraints. Of course, nothing turns on how we use the words 'degree of similarity'. Rather, the point is to distinguish the different levels of ideologicalcommitment (in Quine's sense) which different kinds of judgment of similarity involve. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Williamson, T First-order logics for comparative similarity |
| title | First-order logics for comparative similarity |
| title_full | First-order logics for comparative similarity |
| title_fullStr | First-order logics for comparative similarity |
| title_full_unstemmed | First-order logics for comparative similarity |
| title_short | First-order logics for comparative similarity |
| title_sort | first order logics for comparative similarity |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsont firstorderlogicsforcomparativesimilarity |