What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play.
A model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. Subjects bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged...
Autors principals: | Crawford, V, Broseta, B |
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Format: | Journal article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicat: |
American Economic Association
1998
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