Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative.
This article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital (such as job tenure) are included in earnings functions, there may be a sample selection bias because of job-matching effects--because workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage offers....
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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2003
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author | Stevens, M |
author_facet | Stevens, M |
author_sort | Stevens, M |
collection | OXFORD |
description | This article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital (such as job tenure) are included in earnings functions, there may be a sample selection bias because of job-matching effects--because workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage offers. We develop a model for wage offers in a labor market characterized by both specific human capital and job matching. The model provides a theoretical basis for empirical earnings functions containing specific capital, and it demonstrates that sample selection bias reduces the estimated return to specific human capital and tenure. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:40:59Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:47ea8141-2cd5-4f7a-8e0a-9b13b408039d |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:40:59Z |
publishDate | 2003 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:47ea8141-2cd5-4f7a-8e0a-9b13b408039d2022-03-26T15:22:47ZEarnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:47ea8141-2cd5-4f7a-8e0a-9b13b408039dEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2003Stevens, MThis article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital (such as job tenure) are included in earnings functions, there may be a sample selection bias because of job-matching effects--because workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage offers. We develop a model for wage offers in a labor market characterized by both specific human capital and job matching. The model provides a theoretical basis for empirical earnings functions containing specific capital, and it demonstrates that sample selection bias reduces the estimated return to specific human capital and tenure. |
spellingShingle | Stevens, M Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative. |
title | Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative. |
title_full | Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative. |
title_fullStr | Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative. |
title_full_unstemmed | Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative. |
title_short | Earnings Functions, Specific Human Capital, and Job Matching: Tenure Bias Is Negative. |
title_sort | earnings functions specific human capital and job matching tenure bias is negative |
work_keys_str_mv | AT stevensm earningsfunctionsspecifichumancapitalandjobmatchingtenurebiasisnegative |