Ergodic equilibria in stochastic sequential games
Many dynamic economic situations, including certain markets, can be fruitfully modeled as binary-action stochastic sequential games. Such games have a state variable, which in the case of a market might be the inventory of the good waiting for sale. Conditional on the state, players choose in sequ...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Large, J, Norman, T |
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Μορφή: | Working paper |
Έκδοση: |
University of Oxford
2008
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Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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