An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists wa...
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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2000
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author | Gilbert, R Klemperer, P |
author_facet | Gilbert, R Klemperer, P |
author_sort | Gilbert, R |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages," "second prizes," and "fair" behavior. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:41:25Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:48111b1d-1d0d-4701-9d59-aa42654d70cf |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:41:25Z |
publishDate | 2000 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:48111b1d-1d0d-4701-9d59-aa42654d70cf2022-03-26T15:23:27ZAn Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:48111b1d-1d0d-4701-9d59-aa42654d70cfEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2000Gilbert, RKlemperer, PCommitting to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages," "second prizes," and "fair" behavior. |
spellingShingle | Gilbert, R Klemperer, P An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing. |
title | An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing. |
title_full | An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing. |
title_fullStr | An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing. |
title_full_unstemmed | An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing. |
title_short | An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing. |
title_sort | equilibrium theory of rationing |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gilbertr anequilibriumtheoryofrationing AT klempererp anequilibriumtheoryofrationing AT gilbertr equilibriumtheoryofrationing AT klempererp equilibriumtheoryofrationing |