An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.

Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists wa...

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Main Authors: Gilbert, R, Klemperer, P
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 2000
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author Gilbert, R
Klemperer, P
author_facet Gilbert, R
Klemperer, P
author_sort Gilbert, R
collection OXFORD
description Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages," "second prizes," and "fair" behavior.
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spelling oxford-uuid:48111b1d-1d0d-4701-9d59-aa42654d70cf2022-03-26T15:23:27ZAn Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:48111b1d-1d0d-4701-9d59-aa42654d70cfEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2000Gilbert, RKlemperer, PCommitting to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages," "second prizes," and "fair" behavior.
spellingShingle Gilbert, R
Klemperer, P
An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
title An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
title_full An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
title_fullStr An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
title_full_unstemmed An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
title_short An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing.
title_sort equilibrium theory of rationing
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