Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts

Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Sadka, J, Seira, E, Woodruff, CM
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2024
_version_ 1824459181071007744
author Sadka, J
Seira, E
Woodruff, CM
author_facet Sadka, J
Seira, E
Woodruff, CM
author_sort Sadka, J
collection OXFORD
description Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labour court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration. The experiment generates the first experimental evidence in live court cases that reducing information asymmetries results in a decrease in delay, an outcome predicted by many theories of bargaining. We also find that the information treatment is effective only when the plaintiff is present to receive it directly, suggesting agency issues between plaintiffs and their private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T08:19:57Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:484055ff-164f-4612-a0dc-71c78ad910e1
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2025-02-19T04:37:42Z
publishDate 2024
publisher Oxford University Press
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:484055ff-164f-4612-a0dc-71c78ad910e12025-02-07T10:58:16ZInformation and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courtsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:484055ff-164f-4612-a0dc-71c78ad910e1EnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2024Sadka, JSeira, EWoodruff, CMWell-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labour court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration. The experiment generates the first experimental evidence in live court cases that reducing information asymmetries results in a decrease in delay, an outcome predicted by many theories of bargaining. We also find that the information treatment is effective only when the plaintiff is present to receive it directly, suggesting agency issues between plaintiffs and their private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.
spellingShingle Sadka, J
Seira, E
Woodruff, CM
Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts
title Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts
title_full Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts
title_fullStr Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts
title_full_unstemmed Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts
title_short Information and bargaining through agents: experimental evidence from Mexico’s labor courts
title_sort information and bargaining through agents experimental evidence from mexico s labor courts
work_keys_str_mv AT sadkaj informationandbargainingthroughagentsexperimentalevidencefrommexicoslaborcourts
AT seirae informationandbargainingthroughagentsexperimentalevidencefrommexicoslaborcourts
AT woodruffcm informationandbargainingthroughagentsexperimentalevidencefrommexicoslaborcourts