Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children
Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit's non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2009
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| _version_ | 1797066702003896320 |
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| author | Kahane, G |
| author_facet | Kahane, G |
| author_sort | Kahane, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit's non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover's argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in the attitudes that could motivate such procreative choices, attitudes that, properly characterized, turn out to be person-affecting in character. I conclude by arguing that prospective parents who want to create a child with an impairment face a dilemma. If they want to avoid the charge that their aim is morally defective, they must deny that the desired impairment is harmful. But this would commit them to endorsing the controversial claim that it is morally permissible or even required to turn normal children into impaired ones. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:45:48Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:4989780b-f36a-4b40-b6f4-9e4258958649 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:45:48Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4989780b-f36a-4b40-b6f4-9e42589586492022-03-26T15:32:13ZNon-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future childrenJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4989780b-f36a-4b40-b6f4-9e4258958649EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2009Kahane, GAlthough most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit's non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover's argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in the attitudes that could motivate such procreative choices, attitudes that, properly characterized, turn out to be person-affecting in character. I conclude by arguing that prospective parents who want to create a child with an impairment face a dilemma. If they want to avoid the charge that their aim is morally defective, they must deny that the desired impairment is harmful. But this would commit them to endorsing the controversial claim that it is morally permissible or even required to turn normal children into impaired ones. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008. |
| spellingShingle | Kahane, G Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children |
| title | Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children |
| title_full | Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children |
| title_fullStr | Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children |
| title_full_unstemmed | Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children |
| title_short | Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children |
| title_sort | non identity self defeat and attitudes to future children |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kahaneg nonidentityselfdefeatandattitudestofuturechildren |