Strategic mass killings
Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass ki...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working paper |
| Published: |
University of Oxford
2010
|
| _version_ | 1797066799826599936 |
|---|---|
| author | Esteban, J Morelli, M Rohner, D |
| author_facet | Esteban, J Morelli, M Rohner, D |
| author_sort | Esteban, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military con.ict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, signi.cant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting ff¤orts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups .ght harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:47:11Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:4a00fd3a-9d13-494f-aa00-b515ab843cd5 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:47:11Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4a00fd3a-9d13-494f-aa00-b515ab843cd52022-03-26T15:35:05ZStrategic mass killingsWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:4a00fd3a-9d13-494f-aa00-b515ab843cd5Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2010Esteban, JMorelli, MRohner, DSince World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military con.ict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, signi.cant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting ff¤orts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups .ght harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data. |
| spellingShingle | Esteban, J Morelli, M Rohner, D Strategic mass killings |
| title | Strategic mass killings |
| title_full | Strategic mass killings |
| title_fullStr | Strategic mass killings |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic mass killings |
| title_short | Strategic mass killings |
| title_sort | strategic mass killings |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT estebanj strategicmasskillings AT morellim strategicmasskillings AT rohnerd strategicmasskillings |