Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict
In my DPhil thesis I critique a philosophical ideal of mental organization: that one’s mind ought to be integrated, that is, lack conflicts or ambivalence between mental states, because disintegration is argued to impair one’s agency and undermine one’s well-being. My argument has three parts. In pa...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2015
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| _version_ | 1826316571962769408 |
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| author | Brunning, L |
| author2 | Harcourt, E |
| author_facet | Harcourt, E Brunning, L |
| author_sort | Brunning, L |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In my DPhil thesis I critique a philosophical ideal of mental organization: that one’s mind ought to be integrated, that is, lack conflicts or ambivalence between mental states, because disintegration is argued to impair one’s agency and undermine one’s well-being. My argument has three parts. In part one, I describe Plato’s maximalist version of the ideal where, if ideally organized, one’s psyche lacks conflicts because one’s rational faculty, aware of what is valuable, harmonises one’s motivational and affective states. I also argue that any dispute about integration is orthogonal to the dispute between value monists and value pluralists. In part two, I contest the integration ideal by criticizing three manifestations of it in contemporary philosophy. I focus on the organization of desire, and on deliberative and affective ambivalence. My arguments have a similar structure. First, I challenge the link between the integrated mind and the purported benefits of unimpaired agency and well-being. On investigation, this apparent connection is largely contingent. Not all conflicts or ambivalence are harmful, and other social or psychological factors are relevant in case where they really are damaging. Secondly, I argue that there are contexts where integration is a form of mental rigidity or harmful impoverishment. Thirdly, I argue that being disintegrated seems morally good in some situations where one manifests fitting states of mind, particularly emotions. In part three, I ask whether integration can be reinterpreted to salvage an alternative ideal. After rejecting a promising candidate found in Kleinian psychoanalytic theory, I offer my own account of integration as a two-part capacity to tolerate difficult mental states (not necessarily <em>bad</em> mental states - excitement can be hard to tolerate), and to avoid being reflectively passive as one’s mental organization changes. This capacity has rational and non-rational elements. Finally, I consider how this reinterpreted capacity relates to the practice of virtue. I conclude that integration is not a virtue, and may be compatible with some viciousness, but it enables one to be virtuous in situations where there are pressures towards being insensitively singleminded. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:47:12Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:4a0288d4-7c6d-4dc3-9ee7-8508b205e9e7 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:47:26Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4a0288d4-7c6d-4dc3-9ee7-8508b205e9e72024-12-08T10:08:20ZIntegration, ambivalence, and mental conflict Thesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:4a0288d4-7c6d-4dc3-9ee7-8508b205e9e7Ethics (Moral philosophy)Philosophy of mindPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2015Brunning, LHarcourt, EIn my DPhil thesis I critique a philosophical ideal of mental organization: that one’s mind ought to be integrated, that is, lack conflicts or ambivalence between mental states, because disintegration is argued to impair one’s agency and undermine one’s well-being. My argument has three parts. In part one, I describe Plato’s maximalist version of the ideal where, if ideally organized, one’s psyche lacks conflicts because one’s rational faculty, aware of what is valuable, harmonises one’s motivational and affective states. I also argue that any dispute about integration is orthogonal to the dispute between value monists and value pluralists. In part two, I contest the integration ideal by criticizing three manifestations of it in contemporary philosophy. I focus on the organization of desire, and on deliberative and affective ambivalence. My arguments have a similar structure. First, I challenge the link between the integrated mind and the purported benefits of unimpaired agency and well-being. On investigation, this apparent connection is largely contingent. Not all conflicts or ambivalence are harmful, and other social or psychological factors are relevant in case where they really are damaging. Secondly, I argue that there are contexts where integration is a form of mental rigidity or harmful impoverishment. Thirdly, I argue that being disintegrated seems morally good in some situations where one manifests fitting states of mind, particularly emotions. In part three, I ask whether integration can be reinterpreted to salvage an alternative ideal. After rejecting a promising candidate found in Kleinian psychoanalytic theory, I offer my own account of integration as a two-part capacity to tolerate difficult mental states (not necessarily <em>bad</em> mental states - excitement can be hard to tolerate), and to avoid being reflectively passive as one’s mental organization changes. This capacity has rational and non-rational elements. Finally, I consider how this reinterpreted capacity relates to the practice of virtue. I conclude that integration is not a virtue, and may be compatible with some viciousness, but it enables one to be virtuous in situations where there are pressures towards being insensitively singleminded. |
| spellingShingle | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Philosophy of mind Philosophy Brunning, L Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict |
| title | Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict |
| title_full | Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict |
| title_fullStr | Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict |
| title_full_unstemmed | Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict |
| title_short | Integration, ambivalence, and mental conflict |
| title_sort | integration ambivalence and mental conflict |
| topic | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Philosophy of mind Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT brunningl integrationambivalenceandmentalconflict |