Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism
Adam Smith rejected Mandeville’s invisible-hand doctrine of ‘private vices, publick benefits’. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments his model of the ‘impartial spectator’ is driven by not by sympathy for other people, but by their approbation. Approbation needs to be authenticated, and in Smith’s model...
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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University of Oxford
2012
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| _version_ | 1826309973680848896 |
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| author | Offer, A |
| author_facet | Offer, A |
| author_sort | Offer, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Adam Smith rejected Mandeville’s invisible-hand doctrine of ‘private vices, publick benefits’. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments his model of the ‘impartial spectator’ is driven by not by sympathy for other people, but by their approbation. Approbation needs to be authenticated, and in Smith’s model authentication relies on innate virtue, which is unrealistic. An alternative model of ‘regard’ is applied, which makes use of signalling and is more pragmatic. Modern versions of the invisible hand in rational choice theory and neo-liberalism are shown to be radical departures from the ethical legacy of Enlightenment and utilitarian economics, and are inconsistent with Adam Smith’s own position. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:45:14Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:4a899a98-8bf8-4ced-965b-e6280441f1da |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:45:14Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4a899a98-8bf8-4ced-965b-e6280441f1da2023-05-26T08:07:48ZSelf-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalismWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:4a899a98-8bf8-4ced-965b-e6280441f1daEnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2012Offer, AAdam Smith rejected Mandeville’s invisible-hand doctrine of ‘private vices, publick benefits’. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments his model of the ‘impartial spectator’ is driven by not by sympathy for other people, but by their approbation. Approbation needs to be authenticated, and in Smith’s model authentication relies on innate virtue, which is unrealistic. An alternative model of ‘regard’ is applied, which makes use of signalling and is more pragmatic. Modern versions of the invisible hand in rational choice theory and neo-liberalism are shown to be radical departures from the ethical legacy of Enlightenment and utilitarian economics, and are inconsistent with Adam Smith’s own position. |
| spellingShingle | Offer, A Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism |
| title | Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism |
| title_full | Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism |
| title_fullStr | Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism |
| title_short | Self-interest, sympathy and the invisible hand: from Adam Smith to market liberalism |
| title_sort | self interest sympathy and the invisible hand from adam smith to market liberalism |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT offera selfinterestsympathyandtheinvisiblehandfromadamsmithtomarketliberalism |