No best world: creaturely freedom
William Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to bl...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2005
|
| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1826271050701209600 |
|---|---|
| author | Leftow, B |
| author_facet | Leftow, B |
| author_sort | Leftow, B |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | William Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to block the better-world argument is the assumption that creatures have libertarian free will. I also foreclose what might seem a promising way around the 'moral-luck' counter I develop, and contend that it is in a way impossible to get around. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:50:31Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:4b194e78-56b5-4bd9-a58f-8fcf0f54942c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:50:31Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4b194e78-56b5-4bd9-a58f-8fcf0f54942c2022-03-26T15:41:31ZNo best world: creaturely freedomJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4b194e78-56b5-4bd9-a58f-8fcf0f54942cPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetCambridge University Press2005Leftow, BWilliam Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to block the better-world argument is the assumption that creatures have libertarian free will. I also foreclose what might seem a promising way around the 'moral-luck' counter I develop, and contend that it is in a way impossible to get around. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Leftow, B No best world: creaturely freedom |
| title | No best world: creaturely freedom |
| title_full | No best world: creaturely freedom |
| title_fullStr | No best world: creaturely freedom |
| title_full_unstemmed | No best world: creaturely freedom |
| title_short | No best world: creaturely freedom |
| title_sort | no best world creaturely freedom |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT leftowb nobestworldcreaturelyfreedom |