Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture

Random selection for political office—or “sortition”—is increasingly seen as a promising tool for democratic renewal. Critics worry, however, that replacing elected and appointed officials with randomly selected citizens would only exacerbate elite manipulation of political processes. This article a...

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Main Author: Bagg, S
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2022
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author Bagg, S
author_facet Bagg, S
author_sort Bagg, S
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description Random selection for political office—or “sortition”—is increasingly seen as a promising tool for democratic renewal. Critics worry, however, that replacing elected and appointed officials with randomly selected citizens would only exacerbate elite manipulation of political processes. This article argues that sortition can contribute to democratic renewal, but that its genuine promise is obscured by the excessive ambition and misplaced focus of prevailing models. Casting random selection as a route to accurate representation of the popular will, most contemporary proposals require randomly selected citizens to perform legislative tasks, whose open-endedness grants substantial discretion to elite agenda setters and facilitators. The real democratic promise of sortition-based reforms, I argue, lies in obstructing elite capture at critical junctures: a narrower task of oversight that creates fewer opportunities for elite manipulation. In such contexts, the benefits of empowering ordinary people—resulting from their immunity to certain distorting influences on career officials—plausibly outweigh the risks.
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spelling oxford-uuid:4c005649-e132-416b-a5a2-d2ae3a789a092024-02-08T08:07:06ZSortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite captureJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4c005649-e132-416b-a5a2-d2ae3a789a09EnglishSymplectic ElementsWiley2022Bagg, SRandom selection for political office—or “sortition”—is increasingly seen as a promising tool for democratic renewal. Critics worry, however, that replacing elected and appointed officials with randomly selected citizens would only exacerbate elite manipulation of political processes. This article argues that sortition can contribute to democratic renewal, but that its genuine promise is obscured by the excessive ambition and misplaced focus of prevailing models. Casting random selection as a route to accurate representation of the popular will, most contemporary proposals require randomly selected citizens to perform legislative tasks, whose open-endedness grants substantial discretion to elite agenda setters and facilitators. The real democratic promise of sortition-based reforms, I argue, lies in obstructing elite capture at critical junctures: a narrower task of oversight that creates fewer opportunities for elite manipulation. In such contexts, the benefits of empowering ordinary people—resulting from their immunity to certain distorting influences on career officials—plausibly outweigh the risks.
spellingShingle Bagg, S
Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture
title Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture
title_full Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture
title_fullStr Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture
title_full_unstemmed Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture
title_short Sortition as anti-corruption: popular oversight against elite capture
title_sort sortition as anti corruption popular oversight against elite capture
work_keys_str_mv AT baggs sortitionasanticorruptionpopularoversightagainstelitecapture