From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action
We investigate a core challenge in building multi-stakeholder institutions for collective action: constructive ambiguity – the deliberate use of imprecise language on a contested issue – is often needed to overcome conflict and enable agreement among parties. This initially enabling characteristic m...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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SAGE Publications
2025
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author | Reinecke, J Donaghey, J |
author_facet | Reinecke, J Donaghey, J |
author_sort | Reinecke, J |
collection | OXFORD |
description | We investigate a core challenge in building multi-stakeholder institutions for collective
action: constructive ambiguity – the deliberate use of imprecise language on a contested issue
– is often needed to overcome conflict and enable agreement among parties. This initially
enabling characteristic may complicate implementation when ambiguous commitments must
be translated into concrete actions. To examine this challenge, we draw on an eight-year
study of the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety among unions, NGOs and 200+
company signatories to end the series of deadly incidents in the Bangladesh garment sector.
Despite the risk of diluting the agreement during implementation, we reveal a multi-phase
political process that triggered a reinforcing process of escalating commitment, leading to the
institution’s expansion in scale and scope. This involved signatories negotiating more
stringent commitments on the one hand and stakeholder dynamics activating cascading layers
of commitment enforcement on the other, driving signatories toward deeper institutional tiein with the collective action institution. The process results in transforming constructive
ambiguity into a catalyst for developing a robust collective action institution. We develop a
model that explains how collective rationality can emerge and direct private interests toward
collective ends to resolve transnational collective action problems. |
first_indexed | 2025-02-19T04:37:44Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:4cb05156-5ec4-4b77-b773-64233a568d67 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2025-02-19T04:37:44Z |
publishDate | 2025 |
publisher | SAGE Publications |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:4cb05156-5ec4-4b77-b773-64233a568d672025-02-06T11:27:48ZFrom constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective actionJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4cb05156-5ec4-4b77-b773-64233a568d67EnglishSymplectic ElementsSAGE Publications2025Reinecke, JDonaghey, JWe investigate a core challenge in building multi-stakeholder institutions for collective action: constructive ambiguity – the deliberate use of imprecise language on a contested issue – is often needed to overcome conflict and enable agreement among parties. This initially enabling characteristic may complicate implementation when ambiguous commitments must be translated into concrete actions. To examine this challenge, we draw on an eight-year study of the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety among unions, NGOs and 200+ company signatories to end the series of deadly incidents in the Bangladesh garment sector. Despite the risk of diluting the agreement during implementation, we reveal a multi-phase political process that triggered a reinforcing process of escalating commitment, leading to the institution’s expansion in scale and scope. This involved signatories negotiating more stringent commitments on the one hand and stakeholder dynamics activating cascading layers of commitment enforcement on the other, driving signatories toward deeper institutional tiein with the collective action institution. The process results in transforming constructive ambiguity into a catalyst for developing a robust collective action institution. We develop a model that explains how collective rationality can emerge and direct private interests toward collective ends to resolve transnational collective action problems. |
spellingShingle | Reinecke, J Donaghey, J From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
title | From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
title_full | From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
title_fullStr | From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
title_full_unstemmed | From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
title_short | From constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment: the evolution of the Bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
title_sort | from constructive ambiguity to escalating commitment the evolution of the bangladesh accord as a transnational institution for collective action |
work_keys_str_mv | AT reineckej fromconstructiveambiguitytoescalatingcommitmenttheevolutionofthebangladeshaccordasatransnationalinstitutionforcollectiveaction AT donagheyj fromconstructiveambiguitytoescalatingcommitmenttheevolutionofthebangladeshaccordasatransnationalinstitutionforcollectiveaction |