Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requ...
Main Authors: | Morrison, A, White, L |
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Format: | Journal article |
Published: |
2005
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