Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted
Animal (and human) societies characterized by dominance hierarchies invariably suffer from inequality. The rise of inequality has 3 main prerequisites: 1) a group in which inequality can emerge, 2) the existence of differences in payoff, and 3) a mechanism that initiates, accumulates, and propagates...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Formato: | Journal article |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado em: |
Oxford University Press
2014
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| _version_ | 1826271805285859328 |
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| author | David-Barrett, T Dunbar, R |
| author_facet | David-Barrett, T Dunbar, R |
| author_sort | David-Barrett, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Animal (and human) societies characterized by dominance hierarchies invariably suffer from inequality. The rise of inequality has 3 main prerequisites: 1) a group in which inequality can emerge, 2) the existence of differences in payoff, and 3) a mechanism that initiates, accumulates, and propagates the differences. Hitherto, 2 kinds of models have been used to study the processes involved. In winner-loser models of inequality (typical in zoology), the 3 elements are independent. In division-of-labor models of inequality, the first 2 elements are linked, whereas the third is independent. In this article, we propose a new model, that of synchronized group action, in which all 3 elements are linked. Under these conditions, agent-based simulations of communal action in multilayered communities naturally give rise to endogenous status, emergent social stratification, and the rise of elite cliques. We show that our 3 emergent social phenomena (status, stratification, and elite formation) react to natural variations in merit (the capacity to influence others' decisions). We also show that the group-level efficiency and inequality consequences of these emergent phenomena define a space for social institutions that optimize efficiency gain in some fitness-related respect, while controlling the loss of efficiency and equality in other respects. © The Author 2013. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:02:31Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:4f14aa7b-a938-40db-941d-bd23601161bb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:02:31Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4f14aa7b-a938-40db-941d-bd23601161bb2022-03-26T16:04:58ZSocial elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restrictedJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4f14aa7b-a938-40db-941d-bd23601161bbEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2014David-Barrett, TDunbar, RAnimal (and human) societies characterized by dominance hierarchies invariably suffer from inequality. The rise of inequality has 3 main prerequisites: 1) a group in which inequality can emerge, 2) the existence of differences in payoff, and 3) a mechanism that initiates, accumulates, and propagates the differences. Hitherto, 2 kinds of models have been used to study the processes involved. In winner-loser models of inequality (typical in zoology), the 3 elements are independent. In division-of-labor models of inequality, the first 2 elements are linked, whereas the third is independent. In this article, we propose a new model, that of synchronized group action, in which all 3 elements are linked. Under these conditions, agent-based simulations of communal action in multilayered communities naturally give rise to endogenous status, emergent social stratification, and the rise of elite cliques. We show that our 3 emergent social phenomena (status, stratification, and elite formation) react to natural variations in merit (the capacity to influence others' decisions). We also show that the group-level efficiency and inequality consequences of these emergent phenomena define a space for social institutions that optimize efficiency gain in some fitness-related respect, while controlling the loss of efficiency and equality in other respects. © The Author 2013. |
| spellingShingle | David-Barrett, T Dunbar, R Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| title | Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| title_full | Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| title_fullStr | Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| title_full_unstemmed | Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| title_short | Social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| title_sort | social elites can emerge naturally when interaction in networks is restricted |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT davidbarrettt socialelitescanemergenaturallywheninteractioninnetworksisrestricted AT dunbarr socialelitescanemergenaturallywheninteractioninnetworksisrestricted |